As the supreme ruler, he aspired to the desire of the former province of the Russian Empire to become an independent state.
The history of the discussion in the White Guard circles of the issue of recognition of the independence of Finland in 1919 in exchange for assisting the Finnish army in the offensive of the white North-Western army of General N.N. Yudenich to Petrograd is extremely valuable in two aspects: first, it helps expose insinuations about the "anti-national policy" of the White movement, rooted in Soviet propaganda of past years; secondly, it allows dispelling the equally widespread opposite opinion about the “political inflexibility” of the Supreme Ruler Admiral A.V. Kolchak, who allegedly “missed” out of great-power “stubbornness” the opportunity to take Petrograd with the help of the Finns.
Most recently, this issue was substantively covered in an interesting article by V.P. Naumov [1] . I would like to supplement it with some equally interesting data. By itself, the question of attracting military assistance to Finland arose in January 1919. On January 25, 1919, the Russian ambassador to Sweden, Bairr, transmitted the secret telegram through the head of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, I.I. Sukin's message of General N.N. Yudenich A.V. Kolchak, in which the general noted: “With the fall of Germany, the possibility of a new front for action against the Bolsheviks opened, based on Finland and the Baltic provinces; the convenience of communication with Entente (Entente - V.Kh.), the short distance to St. Petersburg and Moscow, the two centers of Bolshevism, with a well-developed network of communication lines are the benefits of this direction. ” In this regard, Yudenich expressed the view that it was necessary to influence Finland and the Baltic governments through allies, so that they would provide the opportunity and technical assistance for the formation of the White North-Western Army on their territory, as well as food for the population of Petrograd after it was taken [2] .
There was a question about the conditions under which Finland would assist. According to the Russian ambassador to England V.D. Nabokov February 14, 1919, the largest liberal politician and theorist P.B. Struve, on his way from Finland to Paris, told him that “Russian leaders grouped around Yudenich and Kartashev (leading political advisor to Yudenich, member of the Central Committee of the Cadet Party - V.Kh.), without reservation, began to motivate the recognition of Finland’s independence ... Struve argues - emphasized Nabokov, who sympathized with this idea, - and his recall is competent for me, - that the present Finnish government is most favorable for us. My personal relations with the local Finnish representatives have established that they highly value our recognition of their newborn independence and that it would be short-sighted not to use this mood ” [3] .
Literally three days later, Nabokov appeals to I.I. To a bitch with a new insistent telegram about Finland: “I urge you to feel that the independence of the latter is an accomplished fact. The Powers of Concord will recognize it sooner or later, and there is no reason to think that they will seriously take into account this or that attitude of the Russian government, which they themselves do not dare to recognize yet ” [4] .
Thus, the issue of Finland entered a phase of active discussion in the higher spheres of the White movement in February 1919. On February 24, Foreign Minister SDD expressed his authoritative opinion. Sazonov from Paris. He took a cautious and not quite clear position (we give the full text of the telegram):
“The suggestion to create a military force from Finland under the leadership of Yudenich to fight the Bolsheviks raises the question of our attitude to the harassment of the Finns, who are inclined to support Yudenich subject to the prior clarification of this issue. In my opinion, no one in our time is authorized to give any assurances in the sense of recognizing the independence of Finland, since this right belongs exclusively to the future Russian Popular Assembly. Although Finland does not have the right to unilaterally break its connection with Russia, I nevertheless believe that under the present circumstances we should still take into account the situation that we are unable to resist. Therefore, in view of the urgent need to give Yudenich the opportunity to prepare an attack on Petrograd, we now need to refrain from arguing with Finland. I would like to know if you support this opinion ” [5] .
A similar position was taken by Sazonov’s associate in the Russian political meeting in Paris, the Russian ambassador to France, V.A. Maklakov. In solidarity with Sazonov’s opinion, he sends a telegram for Kolchak on March 3, developing and explaining this position: “Finns — forces us to reckon with the intention of the latter to use the situation to gain recognition from us for their independence. I insist on the incompetence of anyone other than the All-Russian National Assembly to speak out on this subject. ... The urgent need for Yudenich to prepare with the help of Finland an attack on Petrograd, which is impossible without their assistance. Nevertheless, in view of the danger of destroying the work begun by Yudenich, I think that we should find means at least in part to satisfy the Finns. According to the data available here, this could perhaps be achieved by a statement that we do not object to the granting of independence to Finland, provided that the strategic interests of Russia and the protection of St. Petersburg are guaranteed. We could even supplement this with a promise in due time to support such a resolution of the issue before the Russian People’s Assembly. For his part, Tchaikovsky (head of the government of the Northern Region - V.Kh.) agrees to such a statement. Please tell us by telegraph immediately if you agree to authorize me (the request comes from Sazonov - V.Kh.) if you need to make such a statement on your behalf [6] .
Thus, Sazonov essentially inclines to the position of supporters of the recognition of Finnish independence, avoiding only the “final” formulations and trying to remain within the framework of formal legality. Such an evasive position would hardly have satisfied the Finns and could not satisfy A.V. Kolchak (only for opposite reasons).
On the margins of the telegrams of Maklakov and Sazonov, the Supreme Ruler wrote a handwritten resolution: “I do not consider anyone competent to speak out on the recognition of Finnish independence before the All-Russian National or National Assembly, and therefore I cannot authorize you to make any statements on this subject from my name. Admiral Kolchak. 8.III.1919 " [7] . Sukin officially notified Sazonov of the admiral's reply by a telegram of March 10 [8] .
At the same time, he continued to fervently insist on concessions to Nabokov, conveying Yudenich's message to Omsk: “Our situation in Finland is becoming very difficult. Tested German people work here ... We are divided across the country, indicate residence points, deprived of the right to move, while German officers, of whom there are many left, travel about Finland freely. ” Reporting rumors about the Finnish speech being prepared under the influence of the Germans on Petrograd without coordination with the Russian White Guards, Yudenich asks: "It is urgent to indicate to the Finnish government that any movement on the Finnish Petrograd without coordination with us ... will be interpreted as an act hostile to Russia" [ 9] . On the activities of the Germans in Finland in favor of the agreement with Soviet Russia and the expulsion of Yudenich reported a little later and the sea agent (attache) in Norway Weimarn [10] . The commander of the Northern White Army, General E.K. Miller reported on the “pan-finnish propaganda” of the Finns in Karelia and was afraid of their desire to alienate Karelia from Russia [11] .
It would seem that by themselves, these messages with the stated depressing facts about the attitude of the Finns to the Russians should have alerted them about their intentions. Instead, Nabokov makes an unexpected conclusion (in the following telegram, filed on the same day): in order to dispel the distrust of the Finns and attract their help, their independence should be more likely recognized, since "the Finnish government will never accept any decision of the Russian National Assembly not sanctioning independence" (which, apparently, corresponded to the truth), and in this case “the Powers of Concord, the peace conference, the League of Nations - all of these decisive instances will undoubtedly be on the point of view of independence” [12] . Thus, according to a prominent cadet in the past, one should simply accept the inevitable.
However, having received the notification of the resolution of the Supreme Resolution that excluded doubts, Sazonov, who was responsible for foreign policy abroad, "takes a visor", admitting only a reservation that the earlier statement he offered to Finland could be made "only from our personal one (Kolchak and Sazonov - B X.) name, and therefore, wearing only a private character, it could not bind the future of the Russian People's Assembly. It is obvious, however, that such a “compromise” would be even less satisfactory to the Finns, for the “loophole” for the Russians would then be sewn with white threads; in the eyes of Russian patriotic imperialists, Kolchak would hopelessly compromise himself with such a "conciliation" [13] .
The attitude to the requirements of independence from Estonia and Latvia was different. N.N. Yudenich conveyed to Omsk through the ambassador to Sweden, Baer: “It is imperative that the Consent powers influence the Estonian government, which requires us to recognize their independence, which we deny” [14] . On this occasion, Sazonov telegraphed Sukin on April 27: “If we recognize the need to base on Estonia on actions against Petrograd, we will have to agree with the Estonians so that they do not interfere with the formation of our forces. This requires a preliminary clarification of our attitude towards Estonian aspirations. I am convinced that it will never be possible to agree on the independence of Estonia and Latvia, but it will be necessary to give these areas wide local autonomy under the condition of ensuring the rights of all national minorities, first of all Russian. Only on this basis are possible negotiations with the Estonian authorities, whose cooperation we now need. Please notify if the Supreme Ruler agrees with the stated view ” [15] .
The exception in the Russian political meeting was B.V. Savinkov, who expressed (according to V. Maklakov) a dissenting opinion, boiled down to the following: since it is impossible to count on Allied loans in the near future to form units of Yudenich, it is necessary to negotiate with Finland and Estonia for help even at the cost of recognizing their independence, or refuse at all from the operation plans for the capture of Petrograd [16] .
In a telegram to Sukin on April 24, Sazonov presented the opinion of the Russian political meeting on the results of the strategic review of General N.N. Golovin (also pointing to the need for assistance of the Finns and Estonians to Yudenich for taking Petrograd) regarding the terms of the agreement with those and others:
"First point. Both parties (Russia and Finland - V.Kh.) recognize that the question of the future situation of Finland is subject to final consideration by mutual agreement between the Finnish Seimas and the Russian people's representation.
Point two. The Finns recognize the special strategic position of Russia both in terms of the naval position in the Gulf of Finland and the protection of the northern border ...
Point three. The Russians pledge that, outside the conditions for ensuring the strategic security of Russia, they do not intend to limit Finland’s independence in any way.
Point four. In the present transitional period, until the formation of the All-Russian People’s Representation will finally determine the position of Finland, the current Finnish government ... is recognized as a de facto Finnish authority, independent in all matters of the internal structure and governance of the country.
Point five. Until the final position of Finland is determined, the Finnish government undertakes not to enter into any military or political agreements with third powers ” [17] .
Thus, a permanent military alliance with Finland was meant rather than the restoration of the old subordinate position of the latter. The actual recognition of the temporary independence of the Finnish government was essentially reflected in the well-known response of A.V. Kolchak on note 5 of the Allied Powers dated June 3, 1919, compiled with the participation of the Cadet Leader, Interior Minister V.N. Pepeliaev and the head of the Foreign Ministry I.I. Sukin [18] . As if in confirmation of the unshakably great-power position, Sazonov, on April 4, notified Sukin about the official statement he made to the representatives of the Entente that “apart from Poland’s ethnographic, no issues can be resolved without Russia's participation and consent” [19] .
However, the diplomats were awaited by a cold shower from a more pragmatic Supreme Ruler. Dispelling their euphoria from the Finns' readiness for help, on May 7, Sukin notified Sazonov through Maklakov: agreeing with the strategic importance of the front for Yudenich White and the desirability of Finnish help, the Supreme Ruler finds it necessary to explain with the Finnish and Estonian governments put in direct dependence on their willingness to attack on Petrograd. According to the information of the French and English governments, the Finnish people allegedly have no such intentions, wanting to limit themselves to self-defense and actions in Karelia ... ”. In this regard, the basis for explanations with Finland developed by the meeting (meaning the Russian political meeting - V.Kh.) is subject to change. The wording of the first paragraph, as it were, predetermines the independence of Finland. The government believes that the state of Finland can only be determined by the Constituent Assembly, preferring not to mention the latter’s agreement with the Sejm. Item two is accepted. Point three is desirable to throw out, limiting the fourth point, at the end of which it is said that the actually recognized Finnish government is left with complete independence in matters of internal structure and management of the country. Point five is accepted. As for negotiations with Estonians, the autonomy formula proposed by you in the widest sense, under the condition of ensuring national minorities, completely coincides with the general national program of the government ” [20] .
Position A.V. Kolchak once again reinforced the message of General D.G. Shcherbachev, who led the White military representation abroad, that the British did not want to get involved in the formation of Yudenich’s front and planned to transfer the subordinate forces to Murmansk to join the Northern Army of E.K. Miller, in connection with which General N.N. Golovin [21] . Meanwhile, by May 1919, Yudenich had only 5.6 thousand bayonets in Estonia, he did not have the money for more [22] .
In April 1919, the Finns, under the pretext of helping the whites, intervened in Karelia. The Helsingfors newspapers published an appeal from the headquarters of the Finnish “White Guard”, which openly stated: “The Karelian people have one common goal with the Finnish volunteers - to liberate the Karelian land from the Russians.” “The attitude of the Finns towards us is hostile,” concluded V.A. Maklakov, - taking advantage of our temporary weakness, they solve their national task - the creation of great Finland ” [23] . This conclusion once again confirms the correctness of the position taken by A.V. Kolchak.
Held in Finland under Yudenich, Rear Admiral V.K. Pilkin in a personal letter to an old friend, the Kolchak naval minister, Rear Admiral M.I. Smirnov, written in May 1919 and reached the addressee only in September, confirmed the fact of the enormous influence in Finland of the pro-German “Union of rangers”, consisting of Finnish volunteers who fought in World War I on the German side. In a letter imbued with hostility towards the Finns, Pilkin writes about the “gloomy stupidity and myopia” characteristic of Chukhnim (adopted in Russia by the contemptuous nickname of the Baltic peoples - V.Kh.), “the strong hatred” of all Finnish political groups. The Finnish press, in his words, "calls Russians bugs, which must be burned out, as locust, plague, etc." The same thing, according to his statement, was happening in Estonia. True, Pilkin stipulates that the attitude of ordinary people in Finland to the Russians is much better, he says: "We did not know hunger for Russia, and when the Swedes, our grandfathers say that we ate bark." Rear Admiral's final opinion: the operation to capture Petrograd is permissible only under the Russian flag, led by Yudenich and under the control of the allies, otherwise the Finns, "if they hate Russia and their butcher character," will cut out all Russians in the capital [24] .
Meanwhile, the ambassador in England, Nabokov, in support of his opinion about the inevitability of the concession to the Finns, reported on May 7: "A representative of the government (British - V.Kh.) said yesterday in the House of Commons that the British government decided to recognize Finland's independence" [25] . Even the next day, the chargé d'affaires in the US brought Uget: “The State Department reported that the de facto independent Finland was recognized by the United States, England, France and Italy” [26] .
White positions in the Baltics partly improved in May 1919: in Latvia with the help of the White Guard volunteer detachment of the captain of the Most High Prince A.P. Lievena was a coup, the anti-Russian government was replaced by a coalition with the participation of Russian (Baltic) Germans of a moderately autonomist sense. England and the United States did not recognize the coup, but Lieven threatened to withdraw from the Latvian-Soviet front if the old government returned to power [27] . At the same time V.D. Nabokov informed the naval minister, Admiral M.I. Smirnov, that Lieven asks Kolchak to recognize his detachment as part of his army and finance it, since until then the detachment was supported by the money of the Latvian government [28] .
Taking into account the whole situation, A.V. Kolchak in the message of N.N. On May 26, Yudenich confirmed his previous position: “Recognition of Finland’s independence can only come from the Constituent Assembly. Currently, no one is authorized to enter into a formal agreement on ethnographic issues on behalf of the Russian " [29] .
June 23, 1919. Admiral A.V. Kolchak sent an official appeal to Mannerheim, saying: “In these decisive days of our struggle with the destructive and anarchic principle of Bolshevism, I would not have fulfilled my duty to Russia if I had not addressed Your Excellency with a completely frank, full of deep trust appeal to which I am urged care for the salvation of innumerable human lives languishing under the regime of the Bolsheviks.
I proceed from the conviction that everything possible must be done to achieve the quickest possible crushing of Bolshevism. Therefore, I would like to hope that you will encourage the Finnish government to take part in the common cause and move on to decisive measures to liberate the northern capital of Russia by launching active military operations in the direction of Petrograd.
On behalf of the Russian government, I want to declare to you that now is not the time for doubts or hesitations connected with any political issues. Without admitting the possibility of any intractable misunderstandings between the liberated Russia and the Finnish nation in the future, I ask you, General, to accept my appeal as a sign of the unchanging memory of the Russian army of your glorious past in its ranks and sincere respect for Russia to Finnish national freedom people. Admiral Kolchak. June 23, 1919 " [30] .
Mannerheim’s reply read: “Please Excellency accept my thanks for the telegram of June 23 I received on the 4th of this month. The majority of the Finnish people, along with me, are following with sympathy the struggle that you, at the head of the brave Russian troops, are leading with the aim of exterminating Bolshevism, especially since we also take part in it, crushing the red uprising in Finland, maintained and controlled by the Soviet government, and then represented by volunteers, responding to the call of the Estonian people and the population of the Olonets province (Karelia - V.Kh.) in their hard struggle against the Bolsheviks. Although I am sure that we can continue to destroy any attempt to raise the red flag of revolution in Finland, but nevertheless [we] know that the Soviet power in them is a constant threat for us and far from indifferent to suffering,experienced by the Russian people under the yoke of the Bolsheviks. In addition to the humanitarian side of the issue, the capture of Petrograd would be of great importance for this city as a stronghold of the military actions of the Soviet authorities in northern Russia, in view of the concentration in it of all the threads of the North-Russian revolutionary propaganda. Therefore, the idea of the participation of the regular Finnish troops and the liberation of Petrograd is far from alien to the Finnish people and their government. I will not hide from you, Mr. Admiral, that, in the opinion of my government, the Finnish Diet will not approve of an enterprise that brings us, although it benefits, but requires heavy sacrifices if we do not receive a guarantee that the new Russia, in whose favor we would act, agreed to certain conditions, the fulfillment of which we not only consider necessary for our participation,but also the necessary guarantee for our national and state existence. G. Mannerheim. Stockholm, July 10, 1919 "[31] .
What kind of conditions were these? VN wrote in his diary. Pepelyaev: “Finns from participating in the capture of Petrograd demand recognition of unconditional independence, self-determination of the population of Karelia and the Olonets gubernia”. And commented on his reaction: "The proposal to reject and respond in the spirit of our notes" [32] .
Kolchak rejected the deal, which Pepelyaev noted with satisfaction in his diary on July 10: “Finland’s claims made during negotiations with Yudenich on the march to Petrograd were declared to be clearly unacceptable. The document is " [33] . Solidarity with the supreme ruler showed the majority of the Cadets. PnMiliukov justified the need to preserve Finland as part of the Russian Empire by its proximity to Petrograd, comparing its geographical significance for Russia with the significance of Ireland for England [34] .
The archive preserves the text of the draft agreement between Yudenich and Mannerheim, which we cite in abbreviations (omitting particular):
“Article I. Russia unconditionally recognizes the independence of Finland.
Article II
1. Finland does not participate in the state debt of Russia and vice versa.
2. Russian purely military property, as well as all ports and buildings in Finland that belonged to Russia before, are transferred to Finland’s ownership. The question of the remaining property is subject to consideration by a special mixed commission, which will establish the amount of remuneration payable. ...
4. The highest decree of February 15, 1864 on the transfer of Finland to the nearest strip to its border, giving access to the Arctic Ocean winter port, is to be executed as soon as possible ...
Article III
1. For the Karelians of the Olonets and Arkhangelsk provinces, the right to full self-determination is recognized ...
5. Neither Russia nor Finland will have military vessels on Lake Ladoga ...
7. The question of neutralizing the Baltic states and Russia is passed to the resolution of the peace conference or the League of Nations ...
Military Administrative Agreement:
1. All military operations of the Russian troops advancing on the Finnish front are led by General Mannerheim through General Yudenich ...
3. For General Yudenich, full freedom of command is recognized ... " [35] .
Thus, Yudenich (to whom the project obviously belonged) was ready not only to “unconditionally” (that is, finally) recognize the independence of Finland, but also recognize the “right of self-determination” of Karelia, that is, fully satisfy the encroachments of the Finnish nationalists.
As evidenced by V.P. Naumov, on the basis of archival documents, the project was unanimously rejected by A.V. Kolchak, S.D. Sazonov and the commander-in-chief of the Armed Forces of the South of Russia, General A.I. Denikin as contradicting the national interests of Russia, in the absence of a guarantee of assistance to Finland “due to internal political difficulties.” The fact is that on July 25, 1919, Mannerheim was defeated at the presidential elections, power passed to the liberal-minded K. Stolberg, after which the official goal of the Finnish policy was proclaimed “national unity, bridging the gap between white and red” [36] . After that, dubious hopes for the possibility of helping Finland became completely ephemeral.
However, N.N. Yudenich to the last clung to the opportunity to attract the help of the Finns. At the height of the fighting for Petrograd, on October 27, 1919, he telegraphed A.V. Kolchak through the charge d'affaires in England E.V. Sablina:
“Urgently. Supreme Ruler. Despite the major successes that have befallen the North-Western Army, I consider Finland’s immediate intervention to be desirable. The Reds intensified the supply of reinforcements from all fronts and from Moscow. Persistent battles go northwest of Gatchina. Pavlovsk and Krasnoye Selo remained red. While success is still on our side, Finland is ready to speak on the basis of the treaty you know, then it will be too late. Sazonov stubbornly protects the sovereign rights of Russia, but Russia itself is not there yet, it needs to be created. Finland’s independence is a fact, we must reckon with it and believe in the power of the future Russia, which will be able to connect economically to the [undressed] suburbs it needs. Now every month the triumph of Bolshevism ruins and destroys Russia. From the telegram of Sazonov I understood that you are ready to come to an agreement with Finland,if such followed in June. Now with Petrograd [not deciphered] I insist on [not deciphered] Before it is too late, please urgently authorize me to enter into an agreement with Finland for her immediate appearance. October 27, 1919 Yudenich "[37] . Despite some undeciphered words, it is clear from the text that Yudenich insisted on an urgent agreement with Finland on the basis of a previously drafted draft in order to attract her to the attack on Petrograd. He received no positive response.
The outlined documents once again refute, on the one hand, the old Soviet propaganda myths about the "sale of Russia" by the White Guards, on the other hand - convincingly prove not only the care of leading leaders of the White movement headed by A.V. Kolchak about the state interests of Russia, but also their pragmatism in this issue.
And the aspirations of the Finnish nationalists to mastering Karelia, and - to an even greater degree - the political situation in Finland itself (at first allowing to doubt its help, and then practically eliminating hopes for it) clearly showed that the a priori recognition of its independence and claims to Karelia were not would not only give expected returns, but would also split the ranks of the White movement itself, marching under great-power patriotic slogans, would create a dangerous precedent for the rest of the national suburbs, and finally gave rise to accusations of illegitimacy and usurpation of the will of the future National Assembly. In this regard, the position of A.V. Kolchak and his associates in this matter are not only imbued with concern for the interests of Russia, but also politically justified at that time.
Historical journal: scientific research. 2013. № 4 (16).
Notes:
[1] Naumov V.P. Correspondence A.V. Kolchak with K.G. Mannerheim and statesmen of the White Guard governments on the possibility of a Finnish offensive on Petrograd (May-September 1919) // Civil War in Siberia: Materials of All-Russia. correspondence scientific and practical. conference. Omsk, 2013. S. 92−98.
[2] GA RF. F. p-200 (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Government, A.V. Kolchak). Op.1. D. 341. L. 8. Telegram of Ambassador to Sweden, Ambassador Baer to the head of the Foreign Ministry Sukin, Jan 25 1919
[3] GA RF. F. p-200. Op.1. D. 341. L. 12ob. Telegram of the ambassador in England V.D. Nabokov to the head of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs I.I. Sukin, Feb. 14 1919
[4] GA RF. F. p-200. Op.1. D. 341. L. 14ob. Telegram of the ambassador in England V.D. Nabokov to the head of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs I.I. Sukin, Feb. 17 1919
[5] GA Russia. F. p-200. Op.1. D. 341. L. 17. Telegram of the Minister of Foreign Affairs S.D. Sazonov, Head of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, I.I. Sukinu for A.V. Kolchak, Feb. 24 1919
[6] GA RF. F. p-200. Op.1. D. 341. L. 31. Telegram of Ambassador to France V.A. Maklakova to the head of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs I.I. Sukinu for A.V. Kolchak, March 3, 1919
[7] Ibid.
[8] GA RF. F. p-200. Op.1. D. 341. L. 37. Telegram of the Head of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs I.I. Sukin to the Minister of Foreign Affairs Sazonov, March 10, 1919
[9] GA RF. F. p-200. Op.1. D. 341. L. 49. The Ambassador’s telegram to England V.D. Nabokov to the head of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs I.I. Sukin, March 11, 1919
[10] GA RF. F. p-200. Op.1. D. 341. L. 91−91ob. The telegram of the marine agent in Norway, Weimarn, to the Minister of the Navy, Rear Admiral M.I. Smirnov, May 16, 1919
[11] GA RF. F. p-200. Op.1. D. 341. L. 100–100ob. Telegram of Lieutenant-General E.K. Miller to the Chairman of the Council of Ministers P.V. Vologda, May 4, 1919
[12] GA RF. F. p-200. Op.1. D. 341. L. 51. Ambassador’s telegram to England V.D. Nabokov to the head of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs I.I. Sukin, March 11, 1919
[13] GA RF. F. p-200. Op.1. D. 341. L. 66. Telegram of the Minister of Foreign Affairs S.D. Sazonov A.V. Kolchak, March 17, 1919
[14] GA RF. F. p-200. Op.1. D. 341. L. 43. Telegram of the Ambassador to Sweden, Baer, to the head of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, I.I. Sukin, March 11, 1919
[15] GA RF. F. p-200. Op.1. D. 341. L. 87. Telegram of the Minister of Foreign Affairs S.D. Sazonov, Head of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, I.I. Sukin, Apr. 27 1919
[16] GA RF. F. p-200. Op.1. D. 341. L. 101. Telegram of Ambassador to France V.A. Maklakov addressed to the Minister of Foreign Affairs S.D. Sazonov, May 4, 1919
[17] GA RF. F. p-200. Op.1. D. 341. L. 88−88ob. Telegram of the Minister of Foreign Affairs Sazonov, Head of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, I.I. Sukin, Apr 24 1919
[18] Hins GK Siberia, the Allies and Kolchak. M., 2008. P. 339; GA RF. F. r-193 (Vologodsky P.V.). Op.1. D. 9. Ll. 22-25. Declaration of the Russian Government A.V. Kolchak to the Allied Powers on June 3, 1919
[19] GA RF. F. p-200. Op.1. D. 336. L. 243. Telegram of the Minister of Foreign Affairs S.D. Sazonov, Head of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, I.I. Sukin, Apr 4 1919
[20] GA RF. F. p-200. Op.1. D. 341. L. 87. Telegram of the head of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs I.I. Sukin Ambassador to France V.A. Maklakov for S.D. Sazonov, May 7, 1919
[21] GA RF. F. p-200. Op.1. D. 341. L. 92. Telegram of Ambassador to France V.A. Maklakov to Minister of Foreign Affairs S.D. Sazonov, Apr 30 1919
[22] GA RF. F. p-200. Op. 1. D. 341. L. 98.
[23] GA RF. F. p-200. Op.1. D. 341. L. 113. Telegram of Ambassador to France V.A. Maklakov addressed to the Minister of Foreign Affairs, May 9, 1919
[24] GA RF. F. p-200. Op.1. D. 341. Ll. 117−120ob. Letter from Rear Admiral V.K. Pilkina to the Minister of the Sea, Rear Admiral M.I. Smirnov, May 1919
[25] GA RF. F. p-200. Op.1. D. 341. L. 103. Ambassador’s telegram to England V.D. Nabokov to the Minister of Foreign Affairs S.D. Sazonov, May 7, 1919
[26] GA RF. F. p-200. Op.1. D. 341. L. 109. The telegram of the Chargé d'affaires in the USA of Uget to the Minister of Foreign Affairs, SDD. Sazonov, May 8, 1919
[27] GA RF. F. p-200. Op.1. D. 341. L. 108−108ob. Telegram of the ambassador in England V.D. Nabokov Marine Minister, Rear Admiral MI Smirnov, May 8, 1919
[28] GA Russia. F. p-200. Op.1. D. 341. L. 111−111ob. Telegram of the ambassador in England V.D. Nabokov Marine Minister, Rear Admiral MI Smirnov, May 8, 1919
[29] GA RF. F. p-200. Op.1. D. 396. L. 58. Admiral A.V. telegram Kolchak Ambassador to Sweden K.N. Gulkevich for the General of Infantry N.N. Yudenich, May 26, 1919 (copy).
[30] GA RF. F. p-200. Op.1. D. 707. L. 1. Telegram of Admiral A.V. Kolchak to General G. Mannerheim, June 23, 1919 (copy).
[31] Ibid. L. 1−1ob. Telegram of General G. Mannerheim to Admiral A.V. Kolchak, July 10, 1919
[32] Diary V.N. Pepeliaeva // Kolchak Okrest: documents and materials / ed. A.V.Kwakin. M., 2007. P. 91. This fact is recognized by the Canadian historian N. Pereira (Pereira N. White Siberia: politics and society. M., 1996. P. 98).
[33] Diary V.N. Pepeliaeva // Okolost Kolchak. P. 92.
[34] Free edge (Irkutsk). 1919. June 26; Dumova N.G. The Cadet counterrevolution and its defeat (October 1917 - 1920). M., 1982. p. 255; Ioffe G. Z. Kolchakovskaya adventure and its collapse. M., 1983. p. 196−197.
[35] GA RF. F. p-200. Op.1. D. 404. L. 16−16ob. The draft agreement N.N. Yudenich with G. Mannerheim, b / d.
[36] Naumov V.P. Decree. cit. Pp. 95, 96.
[37] GA RF. F. p-200. Op.1. D. 713. L. 30. 30. Telegram of the General from Infantry N.N. Yudenich admiral A.V. Kolchaku, Oct. 27 1919
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