On the attitude of the Russian Church Abroad to the Second World War

The meeting of the overseas Russian bishops under the chairmanship of the Patriarch of Serbian Varnava in Sremsky Karlovtsy, at which the “Provisional Regulations on the Russian Orthodox Church Outside of Russia.” Metropolitan Anastassy (Gribanovsky), Bishop Dimitry (Voznesensky)

The position of the Russian Orthodox Church Outside of Russia (ROCOR) during the years of the Second World War has not yet become the subject of much research and is still distorted. Unfortunately, during the Soviet period, all the works devoted to this topic had not so much a scientific as an ideological character. A distinctive feature of these works was the accusations of the Church Abroad in support of Hitler's Germany. Especially in these writings metropolitan Anastasia (Gribanovsky), who headed the Russian Church Abroad during the Second World War [1] . Similar accusations were made by the Moscow Patriarchate. Thus, in June 1945, in the process of preparing a pan-Orthodox condemnation of the Church Abroad, the Moscow Patriarchate prepared a preliminary memorandum signed by the Patriarch of Alexandria, the Antioch, Moscow and Jerusalem. Among the accusations against the ROCOR contained the following clause: “treason against the common Christian cause of fighting fascism” [2] . There is reason to believe that Patriarch Alexy I himself did not want this condemnation, but acted under state pressure [3] . Scheduled conviction failed. Firstly, the idea was not supported by Constantinople, and secondly, the Pan-Orthodox Council was necessary for the condemnation, at which extremely uncomfortable questions for the Soviet leadership could be raised. But the opinion of the ROCOR, as an organization that supported Hitler, still exists even in the church environment. At the same time, the non-seriousness of the approach to the question is indicated, among other things, by frequent references to Archimandrite Ioann (Shakhovsky) and his article “The Hour is Near” [4] . The fact is that Archimandrite John was under the authority of the Russian Western European Exarchate of the Church of Constantinople and had no relation to ROCOR.



What is the position of the Russian Church Abroad in fact?

At first glance, it may seem that she really had grounds for supporting Germany. On the territory of the Reich, the ROCOR had a diocese, and its position was more favorable compared to dioceses in other countries, including Yugoslavia. In the early 1930s. The Foreign Synod did not exclude the possibility of moving to Germany [5] . Since March 1936, the government of Prussia issued a decree granting the status of a public law corporation to the Orthodox Berlin and German Diocese of ROCOR. This ruling was extended to other lands of the country [6] . Thus, the Diocese of the ROCOR became the only legal Orthodox structure in Germany. In 1938, the bishop also changed here. They became an ethnic German, bishop (later Metropolitan) Seraphim (Lyade). In the same year, with the German help in the center of Berlin, the Cathedral of the Resurrection was completed.

Not only a significant part of the Germans, but also a considerable part of the Russian emigration, saw in Hitler a leader who saved the country from the humiliating consequences of the First World War and was ready to oppose the world communist camp. Therefore, at a certain stage, the support of the Fuhrer could have been sincere. In the Berlin Diocese of the ROCOR, commemoration of the state leadership was introduced. On June 8, 1936, the Synod of Bishops prescribed the following formula for the Führer's commemoration. On the great litany in the temples of the ROCOR in Germany, it was necessary to proclaim: "On the Christ-loving Leader of the people of Germany, his government and army, let us pray to the Lord." On a special litany: “We also pray for the Christ-loving Leader of the German People, for power, victory, stay, peace, health, their salvation and the Lord God, most likely, hurry and help them in all and subdue under the nosyaz of every enemy and adversary” [7] .



Metropolitan Anastassy (Gribanovsky)

Another event linking the ROCOR with the German government is the well-known grateful address of Metropolitan Anastassy (Gribanovsky) (June 1938), read at the consecration of the cathedral in Berlin. In his message, the metropolitan not only thanked the Führer for his help in building the temple, but also blessed him to fight against the forces “wanting to destroy our people too”, that is, the communists. “This temple,” the document said, “strengthens our hope that the end of history has not yet come to our long-suffering homeland, and that the Commander of history will send the Leader to us, and this Leader will resurrect our Homeland, just as He sent You to the German people. " After that, a prayer was said for the leader and the state chancellor [8] .

These two facts (the commemoration of Hitler in the Berlin Diocese and the grateful address of Metropolitan Anastassy) still remain the subject of complaints against Metropolitan Anastassy. It does not take into account that the formula of commemoration and a thank-you message were compiled even before the “crystal night” (November 1938), after which the essence of the Hitler regime became obvious, and more than a year before the start of World War II. Since no one considered Hitler to be a criminal, it is not surprising that in those years no complaints against Metropolitan Anastassy came from any of the Local Churches. At the consecration of the Resurrection Cathedral were attended by representatives of the Serbian and Bulgarian Churches. And the Patriarch of Antioch, Alexander III, and the head of the Church of Greece, Archbishop Chrysostom, in their letters to Metropolitan Anastasia, expressed their joy at the help of the “great German government” [9] .



Archimandrite Anthony (Sinkevich)

Archimandrite (later Archbishop) Anthony (Sinkevich), later justifying Metropolitan Anastasia, wrote: if the Moscow church authorities considered the German authorities so criminal, then why didn’t she condemn her government for an alliance with Hitler in 1939? [10] The same idea was expressed in 1946 by Archbishop Leonty (Turkevich), the future head of the North American metropolis: “As for the letter to Vl [adyk] M [itropolit] Anastasia, thanking for the construction of the church in Berlin, then if he put it to blame, why not blame Joseph Vissarionovich for his intercourse with the Nazis in the same years? Must be the same judgment. And besides, it was all BEFORE THE WAR " [11] .

In parallel with this, in the second half of the 1930s. there is also a growing mistrust of the ROCOR leadership towards the Nazi regime. In 1936, at the St. Vladimir's celebration in Belgrade, Metropolitan Anastasius said that fascism cannot be the Russian ideal, because it suppresses human freedom, without which an Orthodox state is unthinkable [12] . Dissatisfaction with the ideology of National Socialism was also apparent in the speeches of delegates to the Second All-Diaspora Council in 1938. [13] In the Russian Church Abroad, the liberation of Russia from the communist regime at that time was associated with other ideas, and above all with the monarchist idea.

The Second All-Diaspora Council noted that Russia's misfortunes stemmed from the fact that it retreated from its Christian mission and rejected the king. The people exchanged their mission for the promise of a lentil soup of earthly paradise and as a result turned out to be in a terrible God-fighting slavery. The Council called the restoration of the Orthodox monarchy a condition for saving Russia. In the face of the coming shocks, the Council called on emigration to rally around the Orthodox Church and specifically around the head of the ROCOR, Metropolitan Anastassy [14] .



Second All-Diaspora Cathedral

A year later, the Russian Church Abroad corrected its position, which was due to the premonition of the imminent war between Germany and the Soviet Union. War seemed imminent. The relevant prophecies were published in the emigrant press. For example, words were attributed to Patriarch Tikhon that he would outlast Lenin, and the Soviet power would fall 15 years after his Most Holy death. They also pointed to the words of the Rev. Nectarius of Optina , that after the regicide (1918), the Russian people were allowed 22 years to repent. "Orthodox Russia" published the words of St. Seraphim of Sarov about the terrible bloodshed that will be sent to Russia for cleansing. They were popular in the late 1930s. and other prophecies [15] .

September 12, 1939, that is, at the very beginning of the Second World War, the ROCOR Bishops' Council was held in Yugoslavia. On the very first day of the Council, a message was unanimously received by Grand Duke Vladimir Kirillovich Romanov, in which he was in fact recognized as the leader of the Russian people. "The Cathedral diligently prays to the Divine World Governor, grant you wisdom to comprehend the signs of the times and clothe you with strength and courage in order to enter the great cause of liberation at the appropriate time by the enslaved godless power of the Native Earth, uniting the whole Russian people around itself," the message said [ 16] . The same Council declared on September 14 that now emigration should unite around Vladimir Kirillovich, and there is no need for the existence of a second center in the person of the Synod of Bishops. It can be said that the leadership of a future free Russia from the Bolsheviks has already been blessed by the Russian Church Abroad [17] .

Germany’s attack on the Soviet Union took place against this background. On the one hand, this background was an expectation of the liberation of Russia from the communist dictatorship, on the other hand - distrust of Hitler.



Archbishop Seraphim (Ivanov)

This duality was reflected in the editorial article of the journal "Orthodox Russia" (June 1941). The author of the article, Archimandrite Seraphim (Ivanov), did not welcome the attack, but spoke of it as the beginning of the restoration of Russia. Archimandrite cited the prophecy of the Monk Aristocracy (Amvrosiyev): “At the command of God, the Germans will enter Russia and save her, but they will not stay in Russia and go to their country” [18] . In this connection, the author of the article recalled Emperor Alexander I, who liberated Europe from Napoleon, but did not take over Germany and France. But is it possible to pin such hopes on Hitler? The author of those articles did not feed. On the contrary, he warned that there is no reason to hope for the nobility of Hitler, and instead of re-creating Russia, its dismemberment could occur. It will be based on the national republics artificially created by the Bolsheviks [19] .

In the future, representatives of the ROCOR looked at this war in their own way, there was no single attitude to it. There were no official orders about the attitude of the Church Abroad to this war.

To understand this situation, we must remember that none of the states (including Germany) could influence the Church Abroad as a whole - its dioceses were located in different countries, on different continents. The Nazi regime could not subjugate all the eparchies of the ROCOR. In addition, the Foreign Synod during the war years was actually cut off from most of its dioceses and did not have the opportunity to send circulars. It is clear that the anti-Hitler speeches of the German cleric would not have remained without punishment. However, a priest in the neighboring Great Britain or Switzerland could bravely oppose Hitlerism. And the pro-German speeches of the ROCOR cleric in America after her entry into the war could have ended for the hapless preacher and criminal prosecution.

Therefore, it is not surprising that the statements about Hitler of the ROCA hierarchs during the war years were different.

Some hierarchs, such as, for example, the archbishops Seraphim (Lukyanov) and Hermogenes (Maximov), considered Hitler the savior of Europe [20] . Archbishop Seraphim (Lukyanov), who ruled the Western European Diocese of ROCOR and found himself in occupied France, is entitled “To the Faithful Sons of Russia”, which referred to Hitler’s crusade against world atheism. “May the devilish gang of villains who have crucified Russia perish,” the archbishop wrote. - May the Masonic star, hammer and sickle disappear from the face of the earth. Yes, the Cross of Christ will shine on the native Earth and in the whole Universe <...> Long live the Great National Russia ”. To understand the degree of sincerity of this hierarch is not an easy task, because at the end of the war he began to sing the Soviet system with no less enthusiasm.



Metropolitan Seraphim (Lyade)

The Western European archbishop was echoed by the head of the German diocese, Archbishop Seraphim (Lyade). In his pastoral address on June 22, 1941, he declared that the war had begun not against the Russian people, but only against the Soviet government with its “devilish anti-religious and communist propaganda” [21] . Subsequently, Metropolitan Seraphim (Lyade) in the messages was supported by the German government.

Some other hierarchs did not sympathize with the Soviet Union. One of the most respected Russian bishops in the United States, Archbishop Vitaly (Maksimenko), addressed a message to American President F. Roosevelt with a request not to render assistance to the communist state. The message indicated that power in Russia was illegitimate, that it had been seized by a group of conspirators — the Comintern, whose goal is to overthrow the legitimate world governments. Assistance to the Soviet state is impossible due to the fact that it is working against the United States, funding local communists and encouraging class hatred. Finally, the power in the Soviet Union remains anti-Russian and continues terror against the Church [22] .

Archbishop Theodosius (Samoilovich) took a sharp anti-Soviet stance in ROCA in South America. He wrote that praying for the Soviet government was “serving the devil” [23] .

But there was the opposite attitude towards war. St. Seraphim (Sobolev) who ruled the Russian parishes in Bulgaria never served as a prayer for Germany’s victory, and the archpastor’s spiritual children, Archimandrite (later Bishop) Parthenius (Stamatov) and Archimandrite Methodius (Zherev), maintained contact with the anti-fascist underground in Bulgaria [24] .

The head of the North American Metropolitan ROCOR, Metropolitan Theophilus (Pashkovsky), and also some other North American hierarchs during the war years prayed for the victory of the Soviet Union [25] .



St. John (Maksimovich)

Some archpastors changed their position during the war. St. John (Maximovich) , Bishop of Shanghai, in the early years of the war, prayed for the victory of Germany and changed his position only at the beginning of 1943. From that time he began to pray for the victory of the Red Army [26] . There is information that the saint made money collections for her needs [27] . In 1945, the archpastor made a thanksgiving prayer service in connection with the victory of the countries of the anti-Hitler coalition.

The position of the head of the ROCOR, Metropolitan Anastasia, deserves special consideration. He did not want to be under the influence of the Hitler administration, and in 1941 he even made an attempt to move from Yugoslavia to Switzerland [28] . The move did not take place, Metropolitan Anastasius remained in Belgrade.

Already in the first months after the German attack on the Soviet Union, it became clear that the Russian Church Abroad with the National Socialists was not on the way. Hitler, who sought to dismember Russia, tried to prevent a single Orthodox Church on its territory.

On August 16, the chief of the security police and SD, R. Heydrich, signed Operational Order No. 10, based on the Fuhrer's directives. The order directly stated that there can be no talk of supporting Orthodoxy and re-establishing the Patriarchal Russian Church. On the contrary, splitting and fragmentation of church groups was encouraged [29] . A. Resenberg, Reich Minister of Eastern Territories, spoke against Orthodoxy as a unifying Russian force. His secret instruction dated May 13, 1942 stated that in the occupied territories any religious community should be limited to the confines of one region, and the Russian Church should not be allowed access to the spiritual leadership in Belarus and Ukraine.

In accordance with the instructions of Hitler, on August 6, 1941, an order appeared signed by the commander-in-chief of the German armed forces, V. Keitel, prohibiting the engagement of clergy from abroad in activities in the "eastern territories". This prohibition, which concerned primarily the Russian Church Abroad, was repeated in other orders of the German departments [30] . Because of the distrust of the ROCOR, different jurisdictions operated in the occupied territories - the Patriarchate of Constantinople, the Romanian Church, the Belarusian and Ukrainian Autonomous Churches, the openly schismatic “Ukrainian Autocephalous Church”, the parishes of the Moscow Patriarchate, the Renovationists. The Germans did not allow representatives of the Russian Church Abroad into the occupied territories - its patriotic, monarchical and Great Russian ideas did not fit into German plans at all. When organizing church structures in the occupied territories, the Nazis stipulated a condition not to enter into contacts with the Church Abroad [31] . Attempts by the latter to send their clerics to the Russian regions captured by Germany ended in failure.

In September 1942, the clergy of the Smolensk and Oryol regions, who did not wish to submit to the newly formed Belarusian Church, appealed to Metropolitan Seraphim (Lyada) of Germany. The clergy declared that they wanted to obey the ROCOR and asked them to send a bishop to Orel. On November 19, the Synod of Bishops proposed that Metropolitan Seraphim take measures to send bishops to Smolensk and Orel and organize church life there [32] . However, this decision remained on paper - Metropolitan Seraphim (Lyada) could not send not only a bishop, but also a deacon to Smolensk and Orel. Moreover, the Russian Orthodox Church Outside of Russia was actually forbidden even to feed some of the German territories. We are talking about the Diocese of Bialystok-Grodno, Germany included in East Prussia. Although this diocese was to be governed by the Berlin-German bishop, in fact the diocese was ruled by the Belarusian Church as a kind of “foreign Belarusian exarchate” [33] .

A similar situation was in Ukraine. In 1942, the initiative group of the Ukrainian Autonomous Church, consisting of the bishops Panteleimon (Rudyk), Veniamin (Novitsky) and Dimitry (Magan), appealed to Metropolitan Seraphim (Lyade) to accept the Ukrainian Church. Metropolitan Seraphim advised the hierarchs to turn to the Reich Commissar of Ukraine [34] . As a result, the ROCA was not allowed to enter Ukraine’s territory, and the request of the Ukrainian hierarchs remained without consequences.

S.V. Troitsky, referring to the letters of Metropolitan Seraphim (Lyada), spoke about the material assistance of the German Government of the Church Abroad [35] . However, studies carried out in the archives of the Nazi departments suggest that the provision of material support to the ROCOR during the war years was out of the question, and the German Diocese remained one of the poorest in the Church Abroad [36] .

Only very few priests who were attached to the Russian anti-Soviet formations got into the occupied territories from the clerics of the ROCOR.

In Europe, the activities of the ROCOR during the war years were also seriously limited. The sovereigns of the Russian Church Abroad did not allow the Hitlerite leadership to convene, despite the constant attempts of Metropolitan Anastassy to get them convened. The only case is the permission to hold the Vienna Conference in October 1943, which opposed the election of Patriarch Sergius in Moscow. But in this case, we can confidently say that this statement of the Vienna Conference was not the result of pressure from the Hitler state. First, Metropolitan Anastasius, before the Vienna Conference, spoke about electing Patriarch Sergius as an anti-canonical act and compared the assignment of Patriarch Sergius with the appointment of Patriarch Ignatius under False Dmitry I - both were ordered by dictators, although with subsequent subsequent approval by the Council of Bishops [37] . Secondly, the meeting participants criticized the position of Germany regarding the Church and the Orthodox population.

The last decision was logical. During the entire period of the Second World War, the ROCOR was oppressed by the German government. After the occupation of Yugoslavia by Hitler Germany, the Gestapo organized a search in the apartment of Metropolitan Anastassy on Krunskaya Street, 20. The work of the Synod of Bishops was also seized [38] . At one time, the temples in Leipzig and Dresden were threatened with closure. The closure did not take place solely because of the fear that such an action would worsen relations with the German allies - Romania and Bulgaria [39] .

I met obstacles and the educational activities of the Church Abroad. Until mid-1942 there was a ban on the import of literature published by the monastery of St. Job in Ladomirovo to the territory of the Reich, Bohemia and Moravia, Belgium, Holland and Serbia. In subsequent years of war, these areas were allowed to distribute literature only in churches or by subscription [40] . On the part of the clergy of the Russian Church Abroad, repeated attempts were made to render pastoral assistance to prisoners of war, as well as to workers who had been taken to work in Germany. However, the German leadership has obstructed here too. With great difficulty, Metropolitan Seraphim (Lyada) managed to get permission to appoint 15 traveling priests who visited the camps. But in practice, the activities of these shepherds depended on the local authorities, who, at their own discretion, decided on the admission of the clergy to the camps [41] .

The position of the ROCOR during the war years was complicated by the impossibility of communication between the Synod of Bishops and the dioceses. Metropolitan Anastasius believed that the obstacles to the normal activities of the Synod were part of German policy. Moreover, the situation did not change even during the agony of the Hitler regime [42] .

The attitude of Metropolitan Anastasia to the Nazi authorities was also manifested in the fact that he did not agree with the demand to issue an appeal to the Russian people to fight on the side of Germany. Metropolitan Anastassy justified his refusal by saying that the real goals of Germany towards Russia are unknown to him [43] . During the war years, the Synod did not have instructions to pray for the victory of Germany, on the contrary, such prayers were even forbidden [44] . Although the Easter message of Metropolitan Anastasia of 1942 contained the words about the “courageous German sword” [45] , this was far from what the hierarch Germany had expected. Neither the messages with the support of Hitler, nor the synodal definitions on the part of the ROCOR, the Nazis did not wait.

What can really be blamed on Metropolitan Anastasia is the blessing given to the Russian guard group, transformed in 1943 into the Russian guard corps, and the Russian Liberation Army A.A. Vlasov. However, let us leave this fact on the conscience of Metropolitan Anastasia himself - this decision was not discussed at the conciliar or synodal level and could not be discussed. Other archpastors and clerics of the Russian Church Abroad quite calmly expressed the opposite point of view on the Vlasov movement. For example, St. Seraphim (Sobolev) forbade Russian émigrés to join Russian anti-Soviet formations, insisting that it was a sin to fight against their homeland [46] .

It is noteworthy that the Serbian Church, more than the other Local Churches suffered from Nazi Germany, treated the behavior of Metropolitan Anastasia during the war years with understanding. Patriarch Serbian Gabriel later turned to the public with words in defense of Metropolitan Anastasia: "Metropolitan Anastassy with great wisdom and tact was held by the Germans, was always loyal to the Serbs, was searched several times and did not enjoy the confidence of the Germans" [47] .

The head of the North American Metropolitan Church of the ROCOR, Metropolitan Theophilus (Pashkovsky), also wrote that Metropolitan Anastasius was not associated with the regime of the national socialists. In 1946, he supported Metropolitan Anastasia, who at that time was able to move to Switzerland and was engaged in the revival of the Russian Church Abroad. Local communists tried to achieve the expulsion of Metropolitan Anastasia from the country. The letter of Metropolitan Theophilus to the President of Switzerland at that moment helped Metropolitan Anastasia. The head of the North American metropolis wrote: “Metropolitan Anastassy manages our Church outside of Russia in the best possible way and is a man of higher ecclesiastical principles and a good life, without interfering with politics. The current campaign of the communist press against him is extremely sad and undesirable and should be ignored. Therefore, I respectfully ask Your Excellency to allow him to remain in Switzerland for the benefit of the Russian Church and the people in Europe ” [48] . Thanks to this letter, the attacks on the Metropolitan gradually faded away [49] .

Thus, it can be said that the accusations of the Russian Church Abroad in supporting Nazi Germany are unfounded. The statements of individual hierarchs in support of Germany are their private opinion and remain on their conscience. Moreover, the Russian Orthodox Church Outside of Russia had opposite examples when the archpastors of the Church Abroad did not hide their negative attitude towards Nazism and the war on its side. The Hitler regime did not receive the blessing of the Russian Church Abroad for a war against the fatherland. The principles of the existence of the ROCOR, based on the idea of ​​a great, united, monarchical Russia, did not allow the Church Abroad to support Germany in this war.

Notes:

[1] See eg.: Gordienko N., Komarov P., Kurochkin P. Politicans of religion. The truth about the "Russian Church Abroad." M., 1975. S. 54; Sulackov A. They write letters provokers. Alma-Ata, 1973. S. Troitsky . About the iniquity of the Karlovac split Editions de L'Exarchat Russe en Europe Occidentale. Repr M. 1992 S. 94 - 96 and others.

[2] DECR archive. D. “Russian Church Abroad”. P. "1945". L. 34 - 34 about. Publ. in: Kostryukov A. Russian Church Abroad in 1939-1964 Administrative structure and relations with the Church in the Fatherland. M. 2015. p. 373 - 374.

[3] This assumption is supported by the fact that Patriarch Alexy I served the requiem for the ROCOR head to Metropolitan Anthony (Khrapovitsky) in 1957, the fact that an overwhelming majority of ROCOR representatives were accepted to the Moscow Patriarchate, etc.

[4] New word (Berlin). No. 27 of 06/29/1941.

[5] DECR archive. The case "Metropolitan Sergius. Correspondence. Western Europe". Folder "1931 - 1933". L. 115 about.

[6] Nikitin A. The Nazi regime and the Russian Orthodox community in Germany (1933 - 1945). M. 1998. S. 116 - 119.

[7] See: Definitions of the Synod of Bishops of the Russian Orthodox Church Outside of Russia // Church Life. 1936. No. 7. S. 99.

[8] Sanctification of the Berlin Cathedral // Church Life. 1938. № 5 - 6. P. 93 - 96; Malice or folly? // Morning Dawn. 1938. № 10 - 11. P. 84-85; The German press on the consecration of the Russian Orthodox Cathedral in Berlin // Church Life. 1938. No. 7. S. 110.

[9] Diploma of the Patriarch of Antioch to the Chairman of the Synod of Bishops // Church Life. 1939. No. 7. S. 101; Diploma of the Archbishop of Hellas to the Chairman of the Synod of Bishops // Church Life. 1939. No. 7. S. 102.

[10] Anthony (Sinkevich), archim . Letter igum. Nikon 09/28/1945 // Archives of the Russian Ecclesiastical Mission in Jerusalem. D. 225-n "Archimandrite Nikon".

[11] Leonty (Turkevich), Archbishop . A letter to the archbishop. Vitaly (Maksimenko) September 5, 1946 // Archive of Holy Trinity Seminary in Jordanville. F. “Talberg”. B. 13. F. 6.

[12] Jubilee collection commemorating the 150th anniversary of the Russian Orthodox Church in North America. Part 2, New York. 1945. p. 34.

[13] See: Acts of the Second All-Diaspora Council of the Russian Orthodox Church Outside of Russia with the participation of representatives of the clergy and laity, held on 1/14 - 11/24 August 1938 in Sremsky Karlovtsy in Yugoslavia. Belgrade, 1939. p. 460, 520.

[14] Ibid. S. 682 - 703.

[15] See ..: Prophecies about the Russian distemper // Heavenly Bread. 1941. No. 1. S. 48; Prediction of prep. Seraphim of Sarovsky about the Russian distemper // Orthodox Russia. 1941. No. 12. S. 2.

[16] GA RF. F. 6343. Op. 1. D. 22. L. 2 vol. - 3.

[17] GA RF. F. 6343. Op. 1. D. 22. L. 8.

[18] Sursky I. Father John of Kronstadt. Belgrade, 1938. p. 196.

[19] Seraphim, Archim . “Lord Jesus Christ, raise holy Orthodox Russia!” // Orthodox Russia. 1941. No. 12. S. 1.

[20] Kosik V. The Croatian Orthodox Church (from organization to liquidation) (1942–1945). A look from the 21st century. M., 2012. P. 42.

[21] Nikitin A. The Nazi regime and the Russian Orthodox community in Germany. S. 402, 403.

[22] Vitaly (Maksimenko), Archbishop . The motives of my life. New York. Jordanville Bd Pp. 162 - 163.

[23] Theodosius (Samoilovich), Archbishop . A letter to a certain hierarch of 09/03/1941 // Archives of Holy Trinity Seminary in Jordanville. F. “Talberg”. B. 1. F. 9.

[24] GA RF. F. 6991. Op. 1. D. 132. L. 216.

[25] Theodosius (Samoilovich), Archbishop . A letter to a certain hierarch of 09/03/1941 // Archives of Holy Trinity Seminary in Jordanville. F. “Talberg”. B. 1. F. 9.

[26] GA RF. F. 6991. Op. 7. D. 28. L. 23.

[27] Pozdnyaev D., priest . Acceptance of the jurisdiction of the Moscow Patriarchate and church schism in Shanghai // Alpha and Omega.1997. № 2 (13). P. 166.

[28] Gregory (Grabbe), Bishop . The covenant of the holy patriarch. M. 1996. p. 323.

[29] M. Shkarovsky. The policy of the Third Reich towards the Russian Orthodox Church in the light of archival materials of 1935-1945. M. 2003. S. 183 - 185. Nikitin A . The Nazi regime and the Russian Orthodox community in Germany. Pp. 312-313.

[30] See .: Shkarovsky M . Nazi Germany and the Orthodox Church. M. 2002. S. 157 - 158, 190.

[31] Alekseev . The Orthodox Church in the German-occupied territory of Russia in 1941-1944. // Church life // Church life. 1957. № 1 - 3. S. 31.

[32] Minutes of the meeting of the Synod of Bishops 19.11.1942 // Archives of the Synod of Bishops of ROCOR. The case of "Metropolitan Anastasius." K. 1.

[33] Alekseev . The Orthodox Church in the German-occupied territory of Russia in 1941-1944. // Church life // Church life. 1957. № 1 - 3. S. 31.

[34] The Russian Orthodox Church during the Great Patriotic War of 1941-1945. Collection of documents. Sost: Vasilyeva O.Yu., Kudryavtsev I.I., Lykova L.A. M., 2009 p. 644 - 645.

[35] S. Troitsky About the Karlovatsky schism's iniquity. P. 98 - 99.

[36] Nikitin A. The Nazi regime and the Russian Orthodox community in Germany. P. 39.

[37] Anastasius, Met. Regarding the election of the Patriarchal Throne of the Patriarchal Throne, Metropolitan Sergius, to the Patriarchal Throne, the Church Life. 1943 № 9. S. 125 - 131.

[38] To the centenary of birth. The Most Blessed Metropolitan Anastasius // Church Life. 1973. No. 5 - 7.S. 45.

[39] M. Shkarovsky. Nazi Germany and the Orthodox Church. Pp. 249 - 252.

[40] Nikitin . The Nazi regime and the Russian Orthodox community in Germany. S. 338.

[41] Kornilov A. Transformation of Russia. Nizhny Novgorod. 2000. p. 87.

[42] Zaide G. The Bishops' Council of 1946 and its significance for the Russian Orthodox Church Abroad. // Church life. 1986. № 9 - 10. P. 170.

[43] To the centenary of birth. The Most Blessed Metropolitan Anastasius // Church Life. 1973. № 5 - 7. P. 46.

[44] GA RF. F. 6991. Op. 1. D. 140. L. 11 - 12.

[45] Church life. 1942. № 4. S. 3.

[46] For more details, see: Kostryukov A. Fire of Fire. The life and legacy of Archbishop Seraphim (Sobolev). M. 2015. P. 120.

[47] Zaide G. The Bishops' Council of 1946 and its significance for the Russian Orthodox Church Abroad // Church Life. 1986. № 9 - 10. P. 162. See also: Polish M., arch . A letter to an unknown bishop on October 22, 1945 // Archives of the Synod of Bishops of ROCOR. The case of "Metropolitan Anastasius." Box 1.

[48] Zaide G. The Bishops' Council of 1946 and its significance for the Russian Orthodox Church Abroad. Pp. 162.

[49] Vitaly (Maksimenko), Archbishop. Letter archim. Anthony (Sinkevich) February 2, 1946 // Archive of the Russian Spiritual Mission in Jerusalem. D. 46 "Letters to Metropolitan Anastasia"

Link

Read more »

Procession in places destroyed by the Bolsheviks temples in the Don region

On November 6, 2017, the Atamans in Kamenskaya, together with representatives of the local clergy, organized a religious procession to the places of the stanitsa destroyed by the Bolsheviks, timed to the 100th anniversary of the beginning of the great unrest in Russia. At noon, all comers gathered at the worship cross in memory of the Pokrovsky Cathedral destroyed after 1937, which was the second largest temple in the entire Don Army. The representatives of the local "registered Cossack" organization also arrived.

The introductory word was taken by our priest of the Society, priest Oleg Sudarev. Then the floor was given to the Chairman and Vice-Chairman of the Company (the text of their appeals is given below). A prayer service was served, Kamensky television was interviewed by the chairman and priest of the Society, and the procession moved up Donetsk Avenue (now Karl Marx Avenue) to another worship cross, established in memory of the Church of the Nativity of Christ stretched by tanks. With prayer having reached this place, lithium was served. All those who wished were invited to the memorial service on the Day of sorrow and irreconcilability, which will be held at 19.00 in the Holy Trinity Church (South, Kamensk-Shakhtinsktii).

Read more »

Desmuntada una placa en honor a Koltxak

El 5 de juliol fou desmuntada la placa dedicada a l'almirall Koltxak a Sant Petersburg. Estava situada al museu d'escultura de la ciutat.

Read more »

Els cosacs autònoms que lluiten a Luhansk

La República Popular de Luhansk (RPL) és un de les que s’ha auto proclamat separada d’Ucraïna. Luhansk i Donestk conformen el Donbass, la zona rebel pro russa. La situació d’inestabilitat és molt gran a la zona i, ni molt menys, es pot parlar d’organització centralitzada. Si a Donestk hi ha un cert caos a Luhansk la situació és pitjor.

El govern pro rus és dirigit per Igor Plotninksy que ha creat un Cos de Milícia Popular (article). Ell va acordar la treva del mes de setembre que va esdevenir definitiva el 9 de desembre. Però Plotninsky només controla en realitat la pròpia ciutat de Luhansk i rodalies. La resta del territori és en mans de diverses milícies amb motivacions ben diverses. Des d’apolítiques formades per “senyors de la guerra”, pro soviètiques, pro Putin o neo tsaristes que volen reinstaurar l’imperi rus. En tota sumen entre 8.000 i 17.000 membres.

Una de les principals organitzacions cosaques russa és la Vsevelikoye (Tot-poderosa) Host Cosaca del Don. D’aquesta es va escindir la Guàrdia Nacional Cosaca de Nikolai Kozitsyn oberta a cosacs no registrats per l’estat. Els cosacs no registrats no poden provar descendència de cosacs tsaristes i no serveixen a l’estat. La Guàrdia Nacional Cosaca aplega la majoria de combatents cosacs a Luhansk.

El seu discurs combina retòrica anti-oligàrquica, soviètica anti-capitalista i nacionalisme rus tsarista. Una barreja suficient per a guanyar suports al mateix temps de sectors d’extrema esquerra europea i nacionalistes eslaus, sobretot russos, ben poc interessats en les idees d’esquerres. El plantejament teòric seria separar Luhansk d’Ucraïna, expulsar els pro russos corruptes i anti cosacs (Plotninsky i, abans que ell Yanukòvitx) i unir la zona amb el Don rus amb autogovern cosac. Aquests grups es van oposar a l’alto el foc de setembre. Les acusacions contra Plotninsky són concretes. Mentre ven el projecte de Novorossiya contra el “feixisme” ucraïnès, es queda amb les ajudes que arriben al territori, no les distribueix al front, les ven i també ven carbó a Rússia per a enriquir-se personalment i la màfia del seu entorn. L’OSCE ha verificat algunes d’aquestes vendes.

Ataman Pavel Dremov

Els dos principals dirigents cosacs de Luhansk són Pavel  Dremov i Nikolai Kozitsyn (avui Rashid Shakirzanov). El primer controla la zona minera de Stakhanove. L’ataman Dremov assegura haver participat a la guerra a Transnístria contra Moldàvia i haver fet de “gàngster” a Rússia. L’abril va viatjar cap a Luhansk on ara dirigeix el “Primer regiment Cosac de l’Host de Cosacs del Don del Districte 31”. Oposat a Plotninsky en tots els aspectes. L’acusa de lladre i es va negar a obeir l’alto el foc fins que Ucraïna no fos expulsada de tot Novorossiya o el Donbass.

Ataman Nikolai Kozitsyn

Kozitsyn dirigeix uns 4.000 cosacs i fou hegemònic a la zona entre maig i novembre de 2014. Ho va des d’Antratsyt, a la frontera, amb la Guàrdia Nacional Cosaca. L’ataman també assegura haver participat a la guerra a Transnístria contra Moldàvia., també va treballar com a funcionari de presons i com a artista del folklore cosac. Ideològicament vol restaurar el Don unificat com a part de l’imperi rus amb Putin com a “Tsar”. Acusat per una altra facció cosaca de vendre carbó a Ucraïna, Kozitsyn fou derrocat el novembre amb la mort de dos dels seus guàrdies. Ell mateix fou deportat a Rússia però els seus seguidors van expulsar els atacants i continuen controlant la zona amb Rashid Shakirzanov com a cap.

A part d’aquestes dues faccions hi ha nombrosos grups més de cosacs armats i organitzats a Luhansk amb suport rus. A Pervomaysk hi ha Yevgeny Ischenko. Va arribar l'abril de Rússia perseguit, segons fonts ucraïneses no confirmades per les russes, per delictes socials. Ischenko està aliat a Dremov però ha estat reconegut pel govern de la República de Luhansk com a batlle de Pervomaysk.

Aleksei Mozgovoy dirigeix la brigada Prizrak (Fantasme), a Alchevsk amb uns 2.000 membres. Aquesta no està formada per cosacs i manté una tercera via entre el govern i les faccions cosaques. Alchevsk és un centre químic i metalúrgic fet que facilita a la Prizrak recursos. Al contrari que la resta de grups, la Prizrak està dirigida per un nadiu de la zona de Luhansk. Com els grups cosacs Mozgovoy s'oposa al govern de Plotnisky. El seu discurs és el menys nacionalista i el més "socialista" de totes les faccions doncs parla de destruir les "oligarquies" per un "poder popular real" i de nacionalitzar la indústria. També vol abolir les eleccions mentre duri la guerra per a poder defensar la nació russa.

Finalment hi ha altres petits grups. A Krasnyi Luch, l'ataman Kozitsyn va nomenar Yuri Kosogor, de l'Host Cosaca del Don, qui dirigeix el lucratiu comerç de carbó. A Sverdlovsk Aleksandr Gaidey , també cosac, es va separar del grup de Kozitsyn i va crear els Gaydeevtsy. Aquests són els dos grups més importants entre molts d'altres en que s'ha dividit el moviment pro rus de Luhansk.

Read more »

Admiral Kolchak and the "Finnish Question"

As the supreme ruler, he aspired to the desire of the former province of the Russian Empire to become an independent state.

The history of the discussion in the White Guard circles of the issue of recognition of the independence of Finland in 1919 in exchange for assisting the Finnish army in the offensive of the white North-Western army of General N.N. Yudenich to Petrograd is extremely valuable in two aspects: first, it helps expose insinuations about the "anti-national policy" of the White movement, rooted in Soviet propaganda of past years; secondly, it allows dispelling the equally widespread opposite opinion about the “political inflexibility” of the Supreme Ruler Admiral A.V. Kolchak, who allegedly “missed” out of great-power “stubbornness” the opportunity to take Petrograd with the help of the Finns.

Most recently, this issue was substantively covered in an interesting article by V.P. Naumov [1] . I would like to supplement it with some equally interesting data.

By itself, the question of attracting military assistance to Finland arose in January 1919. On January 25, 1919, the Russian ambassador to Sweden, Bairr, transmitted the secret telegram through the head of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, I.I. Sukin's message of General N.N. Yudenich A.V. Kolchak, in which the general noted: “With the fall of Germany, the possibility of a new front for action against the Bolsheviks opened, based on Finland and the Baltic provinces; the convenience of communication with Entente (Entente - V.Kh.), the short distance to St. Petersburg and Moscow, the two centers of Bolshevism, with a well-developed network of communication lines are the benefits of this direction. ” In this regard, Yudenich expressed the view that it was necessary to influence Finland and the Baltic governments through allies, so that they would provide the opportunity and technical assistance for the formation of the White North-Western Army on their territory, as well as food for the population of Petrograd after it was taken [2] .

There was a question about the conditions under which Finland would assist. According to the Russian ambassador to England V.D. Nabokov February 14, 1919, the largest liberal politician and theorist P.B. Struve, on his way from Finland to Paris, told him that “Russian leaders grouped around Yudenich and Kartashev (leading political advisor to Yudenich, member of the Central Committee of the Cadet Party - V.Kh.), without reservation, began to motivate the recognition of Finland’s independence ... Struve argues - emphasized Nabokov, who sympathized with this idea, - and his recall is competent for me, - that the present Finnish government is most favorable for us. My personal relations with the local Finnish representatives have established that they highly value our recognition of their newborn independence and that it would be short-sighted not to use this mood ” [3] .

Literally three days later, Nabokov appeals to I.I. To a bitch with a new insistent telegram about Finland: “I urge you to feel that the independence of the latter is an accomplished fact. The Powers of Concord will recognize it sooner or later, and there is no reason to think that they will seriously take into account this or that attitude of the Russian government, which they themselves do not dare to recognize yet ” [4] .

Thus, the issue of Finland entered a phase of active discussion in the higher spheres of the White movement in February 1919. On February 24, Foreign Minister SDD expressed his authoritative opinion. Sazonov from Paris. He took a cautious and not quite clear position (we give the full text of the telegram):

“The suggestion to create a military force from Finland under the leadership of Yudenich to fight the Bolsheviks raises the question of our attitude to the harassment of the Finns, who are inclined to support Yudenich subject to the prior clarification of this issue. In my opinion, no one in our time is authorized to give any assurances in the sense of recognizing the independence of Finland, since this right belongs exclusively to the future Russian Popular Assembly. Although Finland does not have the right to unilaterally break its connection with Russia, I nevertheless believe that under the present circumstances we should still take into account the situation that we are unable to resist. Therefore, in view of the urgent need to give Yudenich the opportunity to prepare an attack on Petrograd, we now need to refrain from arguing with Finland. I would like to know if you support this opinion ” [5] .

A similar position was taken by Sazonov’s associate in the Russian political meeting in Paris, the Russian ambassador to France, V.A. Maklakov. In solidarity with Sazonov’s opinion, he sends a telegram for Kolchak on March 3, developing and explaining this position: “Finns — forces us to reckon with the intention of the latter to use the situation to gain recognition from us for their independence. I insist on the incompetence of anyone other than the All-Russian National Assembly to speak out on this subject. ... The urgent need for Yudenich to prepare with the help of Finland an attack on Petrograd, which is impossible without their assistance. Nevertheless, in view of the danger of destroying the work begun by Yudenich, I think that we should find means at least in part to satisfy the Finns. According to the data available here, this could perhaps be achieved by a statement that we do not object to the granting of independence to Finland, provided that the strategic interests of Russia and the protection of St. Petersburg are guaranteed. We could even supplement this with a promise in due time to support such a resolution of the issue before the Russian People’s Assembly. For his part, Tchaikovsky (head of the government of the Northern Region - V.Kh.) agrees to such a statement. Please tell us by telegraph immediately if you agree to authorize me (the request comes from Sazonov - V.Kh.) if you need to make such a statement on your behalf [6] .

Thus, Sazonov essentially inclines to the position of supporters of the recognition of Finnish independence, avoiding only the “final” formulations and trying to remain within the framework of formal legality. Such an evasive position would hardly have satisfied the Finns and could not satisfy A.V. Kolchak (only for opposite reasons).

On the margins of the telegrams of Maklakov and Sazonov, the Supreme Ruler wrote a handwritten resolution: “I do not consider anyone competent to speak out on the recognition of Finnish independence before the All-Russian National or National Assembly, and therefore I cannot authorize you to make any statements on this subject from my name. Admiral Kolchak. 8.III.1919 " [7] . Sukin officially notified Sazonov of the admiral's reply by a telegram of March 10 [8] .

At the same time, he continued to fervently insist on concessions to Nabokov, conveying Yudenich's message to Omsk: “Our situation in Finland is becoming very difficult. Tested German people work here ... We are divided across the country, indicate residence points, deprived of the right to move, while German officers, of whom there are many left, travel about Finland freely. ” Reporting rumors about the Finnish speech being prepared under the influence of the Germans on Petrograd without coordination with the Russian White Guards, Yudenich asks: "It is urgent to indicate to the Finnish government that any movement on the Finnish Petrograd without coordination with us ... will be interpreted as an act hostile to Russia" [ 9] . On the activities of the Germans in Finland in favor of the agreement with Soviet Russia and the expulsion of Yudenich reported a little later and the sea agent (attache) in Norway Weimarn [10] . The commander of the Northern White Army, General E.K. Miller reported on the “pan-finnish propaganda” of the Finns in Karelia and was afraid of their desire to alienate Karelia from Russia [11] .

It would seem that by themselves, these messages with the stated depressing facts about the attitude of the Finns to the Russians should have alerted them about their intentions. Instead, Nabokov makes an unexpected conclusion (in the following telegram, filed on the same day): in order to dispel the distrust of the Finns and attract their help, their independence should be more likely recognized, since "the Finnish government will never accept any decision of the Russian National Assembly not sanctioning independence" (which, apparently, corresponded to the truth), and in this case “the Powers of Concord, the peace conference, the League of Nations - all of these decisive instances will undoubtedly be on the point of view of independence” [12] . Thus, according to a prominent cadet in the past, one should simply accept the inevitable.

However, having received the notification of the resolution of the Supreme Resolution that excluded doubts, Sazonov, who was responsible for foreign policy abroad, "takes a visor", admitting only a reservation that the earlier statement he offered to Finland could be made "only from our personal one (Kolchak and Sazonov - B X.) name, and therefore, wearing only a private character, it could not bind the future of the Russian People's Assembly. It is obvious, however, that such a “compromise” would be even less satisfactory to the Finns, for the “loophole” for the Russians would then be sewn with white threads; in the eyes of Russian patriotic imperialists, Kolchak would hopelessly compromise himself with such a "conciliation" [13] .

The attitude to the requirements of independence from Estonia and Latvia was different. N.N. Yudenich conveyed to Omsk through the ambassador to Sweden, Baer: “It is imperative that the Consent powers influence the Estonian government, which requires us to recognize their independence, which we deny” [14] . On this occasion, Sazonov telegraphed Sukin on April 27: “If we recognize the need to base on Estonia on actions against Petrograd, we will have to agree with the Estonians so that they do not interfere with the formation of our forces. This requires a preliminary clarification of our attitude towards Estonian aspirations. I am convinced that it will never be possible to agree on the independence of Estonia and Latvia, but it will be necessary to give these areas wide local autonomy under the condition of ensuring the rights of all national minorities, first of all Russian. Only on this basis are possible negotiations with the Estonian authorities, whose cooperation we now need. Please notify if the Supreme Ruler agrees with the stated view ” [15] .

The exception in the Russian political meeting was B.V. Savinkov, who expressed (according to V. Maklakov) a dissenting opinion, boiled down to the following: since it is impossible to count on Allied loans in the near future to form units of Yudenich, it is necessary to negotiate with Finland and Estonia for help even at the cost of recognizing their independence, or refuse at all from the operation plans for the capture of Petrograd [16] .

In a telegram to Sukin on April 24, Sazonov presented the opinion of the Russian political meeting on the results of the strategic review of General N.N. Golovin (also pointing to the need for assistance of the Finns and Estonians to Yudenich for taking Petrograd) regarding the terms of the agreement with those and others:

"First point. Both parties (Russia and Finland - V.Kh.) recognize that the question of the future situation of Finland is subject to final consideration by mutual agreement between the Finnish Seimas and the Russian people's representation.

Point two. The Finns recognize the special strategic position of Russia both in terms of the naval position in the Gulf of Finland and the protection of the northern border ...

Point three. The Russians pledge that, outside the conditions for ensuring the strategic security of Russia, they do not intend to limit Finland’s independence in any way.

Point four. In the present transitional period, until the formation of the All-Russian People’s Representation will finally determine the position of Finland, the current Finnish government ... is recognized as a de facto Finnish authority, independent in all matters of the internal structure and governance of the country.

Point five. Until the final position of Finland is determined, the Finnish government undertakes not to enter into any military or political agreements with third powers ” [17] .

Thus, a permanent military alliance with Finland was meant rather than the restoration of the old subordinate position of the latter. The actual recognition of the temporary independence of the Finnish government was essentially reflected in the well-known response of A.V. Kolchak on note 5 of the Allied Powers dated June 3, 1919, compiled with the participation of the Cadet Leader, Interior Minister V.N. Pepeliaev and the head of the Foreign Ministry I.I. Sukin [18] . As if in confirmation of the unshakably great-power position, Sazonov, on April 4, notified Sukin about the official statement he made to the representatives of the Entente that “apart from Poland’s ethnographic, no issues can be resolved without Russia's participation and consent” [19] .

However, the diplomats were awaited by a cold shower from a more pragmatic Supreme Ruler. Dispelling their euphoria from the Finns' readiness for help, on May 7, Sukin notified Sazonov through Maklakov: agreeing with the strategic importance of the front for Yudenich White and the desirability of Finnish help, the Supreme Ruler finds it necessary to explain with the Finnish and Estonian governments put in direct dependence on their willingness to attack on Petrograd. According to the information of the French and English governments, the Finnish people allegedly have no such intentions, wanting to limit themselves to self-defense and actions in Karelia ... ”. In this regard, the basis for explanations with Finland developed by the meeting (meaning the Russian political meeting - V.Kh.) is subject to change. The wording of the first paragraph, as it were, predetermines the independence of Finland. The government believes that the state of Finland can only be determined by the Constituent Assembly, preferring not to mention the latter’s agreement with the Sejm. Item two is accepted. Point three is desirable to throw out, limiting the fourth point, at the end of which it is said that the actually recognized Finnish government is left with complete independence in matters of internal structure and management of the country. Point five is accepted. As for negotiations with Estonians, the autonomy formula proposed by you in the widest sense, under the condition of ensuring national minorities, completely coincides with the general national program of the government ” [20] .

Position A.V. Kolchak once again reinforced the message of General D.G. Shcherbachev, who led the White military representation abroad, that the British did not want to get involved in the formation of Yudenich’s front and planned to transfer the subordinate forces to Murmansk to join the Northern Army of E.K. Miller, in connection with which General N.N. Golovin [21] . Meanwhile, by May 1919, Yudenich had only 5.6 thousand bayonets in Estonia, he did not have the money for more [22] .

In April 1919, the Finns, under the pretext of helping the whites, intervened in Karelia. The Helsingfors newspapers published an appeal from the headquarters of the Finnish “White Guard”, which openly stated: “The Karelian people have one common goal with the Finnish volunteers - to liberate the Karelian land from the Russians.” “The attitude of the Finns towards us is hostile,” concluded V.A. Maklakov, - taking advantage of our temporary weakness, they solve their national task - the creation of great Finland ” [23] . This conclusion once again confirms the correctness of the position taken by A.V. Kolchak.

Held in Finland under Yudenich, Rear Admiral V.K. Pilkin in a personal letter to an old friend, the Kolchak naval minister, Rear Admiral M.I. Smirnov, written in May 1919 and reached the addressee only in September, confirmed the fact of the enormous influence in Finland of the pro-German “Union of rangers”, consisting of Finnish volunteers who fought in World War I on the German side. In a letter imbued with hostility towards the Finns, Pilkin writes about the “gloomy stupidity and myopia” characteristic of Chukhnim (adopted in Russia by the contemptuous nickname of the Baltic peoples - V.Kh.), “the strong hatred” of all Finnish political groups. The Finnish press, in his words, "calls Russians bugs, which must be burned out, as locust, plague, etc." The same thing, according to his statement, was happening in Estonia. True, Pilkin stipulates that the attitude of ordinary people in Finland to the Russians is much better, he says: "We did not know hunger for Russia, and when the Swedes, our grandfathers say that we ate bark." Rear Admiral's final opinion: the operation to capture Petrograd is permissible only under the Russian flag, led by Yudenich and under the control of the allies, otherwise the Finns, "if they hate Russia and their butcher character," will cut out all Russians in the capital [24] .

Meanwhile, the ambassador in England, Nabokov, in support of his opinion about the inevitability of the concession to the Finns, reported on May 7: "A representative of the government (British - V.Kh.) said yesterday in the House of Commons that the British government decided to recognize Finland's independence" [25] . Even the next day, the chargé d'affaires in the US brought Uget: “The State Department reported that the de facto independent Finland was recognized by the United States, England, France and Italy” [26] .

White positions in the Baltics partly improved in May 1919: in Latvia with the help of the White Guard volunteer detachment of the captain of the Most High Prince A.P. Lievena was a coup, the anti-Russian government was replaced by a coalition with the participation of Russian (Baltic) Germans of a moderately autonomist sense. England and the United States did not recognize the coup, but Lieven threatened to withdraw from the Latvian-Soviet front if the old government returned to power [27] . At the same time V.D. Nabokov informed the naval minister, Admiral M.I. Smirnov, that Lieven asks Kolchak to recognize his detachment as part of his army and finance it, since until then the detachment was supported by the money of the Latvian government [28] .

Taking into account the whole situation, A.V. Kolchak in the message of N.N. On May 26, Yudenich confirmed his previous position: “Recognition of Finland’s independence can only come from the Constituent Assembly. Currently, no one is authorized to enter into a formal agreement on ethnographic issues on behalf of the Russian " [29] .

June 23, 1919. Admiral A.V. Kolchak sent an official appeal to Mannerheim, saying: “In these decisive days of our struggle with the destructive and anarchic principle of Bolshevism, I would not have fulfilled my duty to Russia if I had not addressed Your Excellency with a completely frank, full of deep trust appeal to which I am urged care for the salvation of innumerable human lives languishing under the regime of the Bolsheviks.

I proceed from the conviction that everything possible must be done to achieve the quickest possible crushing of Bolshevism. Therefore, I would like to hope that you will encourage the Finnish government to take part in the common cause and move on to decisive measures to liberate the northern capital of Russia by launching active military operations in the direction of Petrograd.

On behalf of the Russian government, I want to declare to you that now is not the time for doubts or hesitations connected with any political issues. Without admitting the possibility of any intractable misunderstandings between the liberated Russia and the Finnish nation in the future, I ask you, General, to accept my appeal as a sign of the unchanging memory of the Russian army of your glorious past in its ranks and sincere respect for Russia to Finnish national freedom people. Admiral Kolchak. June 23, 1919 " [30] .

Mannerheim’s reply read: “Please Excellency accept my thanks for the telegram of June 23 I received on the 4th of this month. The majority of the Finnish people, along with me, are following with sympathy the struggle that you, at the head of the brave Russian troops, are leading with the aim of exterminating Bolshevism, especially since we also take part in it, crushing the red uprising in Finland, maintained and controlled by the Soviet government, and then represented by volunteers, responding to the call of the Estonian people and the population of the Olonets province (Karelia - V.Kh.) in their hard struggle against the Bolsheviks. Although I am sure that we can continue to destroy any attempt to raise the red flag of revolution in Finland, but nevertheless [we] know that the Soviet power in them is a constant threat for us and far from indifferent to suffering,experienced by the Russian people under the yoke of the Bolsheviks. In addition to the humanitarian side of the issue, the capture of Petrograd would be of great importance for this city as a stronghold of the military actions of the Soviet authorities in northern Russia, in view of the concentration in it of all the threads of the North-Russian revolutionary propaganda. Therefore, the idea of ​​the participation of the regular Finnish troops and the liberation of Petrograd is far from alien to the Finnish people and their government. I will not hide from you, Mr. Admiral, that, in the opinion of my government, the Finnish Diet will not approve of an enterprise that brings us, although it benefits, but requires heavy sacrifices if we do not receive a guarantee that the new Russia, in whose favor we would act, agreed to certain conditions, the fulfillment of which we not only consider necessary for our participation,but also the necessary guarantee for our national and state existence. G. Mannerheim. Stockholm, July 10, 1919 "[31] .

What kind of conditions were these? VN wrote in his diary. Pepelyaev: “Finns from participating in the capture of Petrograd demand recognition of unconditional independence, self-determination of the population of Karelia and the Olonets gubernia”. And commented on his reaction: "The proposal to reject and respond in the spirit of our notes" [32] .

Kolchak rejected the deal, which Pepelyaev noted with satisfaction in his diary on July 10: “Finland’s claims made during negotiations with Yudenich on the march to Petrograd were declared to be clearly unacceptable. The document is " [33] . Solidarity with the supreme ruler showed the majority of the Cadets. PnMiliukov justified the need to preserve Finland as part of the Russian Empire by its proximity to Petrograd, comparing its geographical significance for Russia with the significance of Ireland for England [34] .

The archive preserves the text of the draft agreement between Yudenich and Mannerheim, which we cite in abbreviations (omitting particular):

“Article I. Russia unconditionally recognizes the independence of Finland.

Article II

1. Finland does not participate in the state debt of Russia and vice versa.

2. Russian purely military property, as well as all ports and buildings in Finland that belonged to Russia before, are transferred to Finland’s ownership. The question of the remaining property is subject to consideration by a special mixed commission, which will establish the amount of remuneration payable. ...

4. The highest decree of February 15, 1864 on the transfer of Finland to the nearest strip to its border, giving access to the Arctic Ocean winter port, is to be executed as soon as possible ...

Article III

1. For the Karelians of the Olonets and Arkhangelsk provinces, the right to full self-determination is recognized ...

5. Neither Russia nor Finland will have military vessels on Lake Ladoga ...

7. The question of neutralizing the Baltic states and Russia is passed to the resolution of the peace conference or the League of Nations ...

Military Administrative Agreement:

1. All military operations of the Russian troops advancing on the Finnish front are led by General Mannerheim through General Yudenich ...

3. For General Yudenich, full freedom of command is recognized ... " [35] .

Thus, Yudenich (to whom the project obviously belonged) was ready not only to “unconditionally” (that is, finally) recognize the independence of Finland, but also recognize the “right of self-determination” of Karelia, that is, fully satisfy the encroachments of the Finnish nationalists.

As evidenced by V.P. Naumov, on the basis of archival documents, the project was unanimously rejected by A.V. Kolchak, S.D. Sazonov and the commander-in-chief of the Armed Forces of the South of Russia, General A.I. Denikin as contradicting the national interests of Russia, in the absence of a guarantee of assistance to Finland “due to internal political difficulties.” The fact is that on July 25, 1919, Mannerheim was defeated at the presidential elections, power passed to the liberal-minded K. Stolberg, after which the official goal of the Finnish policy was proclaimed “national unity, bridging the gap between white and red” [36] . After that, dubious hopes for the possibility of helping Finland became completely ephemeral.

However, N.N. Yudenich to the last clung to the opportunity to attract the help of the Finns. At the height of the fighting for Petrograd, on October 27, 1919, he telegraphed A.V. Kolchak through the charge d'affaires in England E.V. Sablina:

“Urgently. Supreme Ruler. Despite the major successes that have befallen the North-Western Army, I consider Finland’s immediate intervention to be desirable. The Reds intensified the supply of reinforcements from all fronts and from Moscow. Persistent battles go northwest of Gatchina. Pavlovsk and Krasnoye Selo remained red. While success is still on our side, Finland is ready to speak on the basis of the treaty you know, then it will be too late. Sazonov stubbornly protects the sovereign rights of Russia, but Russia itself is not there yet, it needs to be created. Finland’s independence is a fact, we must reckon with it and believe in the power of the future Russia, which will be able to connect economically to the [undressed] suburbs it needs. Now every month the triumph of Bolshevism ruins and destroys Russia. From the telegram of Sazonov I understood that you are ready to come to an agreement with Finland,if such followed in June. Now with Petrograd [not deciphered] I insist on [not deciphered] Before it is too late, please urgently authorize me to enter into an agreement with Finland for her immediate appearance. October 27, 1919 Yudenich "[37] . Despite some undeciphered words, it is clear from the text that Yudenich insisted on an urgent agreement with Finland on the basis of a previously drafted draft in order to attract her to the attack on Petrograd. He received no positive response.

The outlined documents once again refute, on the one hand, the old Soviet propaganda myths about the "sale of Russia" by the White Guards, on the other hand - convincingly prove not only the care of leading leaders of the White movement headed by A.V. Kolchak about the state interests of Russia, but also their pragmatism in this issue.

And the aspirations of the Finnish nationalists to mastering Karelia, and - to an even greater degree - the political situation in Finland itself (at first allowing to doubt its help, and then practically eliminating hopes for it) clearly showed that the a priori recognition of its independence and claims to Karelia were not would not only give expected returns, but would also split the ranks of the White movement itself, marching under great-power patriotic slogans, would create a dangerous precedent for the rest of the national suburbs, and finally gave rise to accusations of illegitimacy and usurpation of the will of the future National Assembly. In this regard, the position of A.V. Kolchak and his associates in this matter are not only imbued with concern for the interests of Russia, but also politically justified at that time.

Historical journal: scientific research. 2013. № 4 (16).

Notes:

[1] Naumov V.P. Correspondence A.V. Kolchak with K.G. Mannerheim and statesmen of the White Guard governments on the possibility of a Finnish offensive on Petrograd (May-September 1919) // Civil War in Siberia: Materials of All-Russia. correspondence scientific and practical. conference. Omsk, 2013. S. 92−98.

[2] GA RF. F. p-200 (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Government, A.V. Kolchak). Op.1. D. 341. L. 8. Telegram of Ambassador to Sweden, Ambassador Baer to the head of the Foreign Ministry Sukin, Jan 25 1919

[3] GA RF. F. p-200. Op.1. D. 341. L. 12ob. Telegram of the ambassador in England V.D. Nabokov to the head of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs I.I. Sukin, Feb. 14 1919

[4] GA RF. F. p-200. Op.1. D. 341. L. 14ob. Telegram of the ambassador in England V.D. Nabokov to the head of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs I.I. Sukin, Feb. 17 1919

[5] GA Russia. F. p-200. Op.1. D. 341. L. 17. Telegram of the Minister of Foreign Affairs S.D. Sazonov, Head of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, I.I. Sukinu for A.V. Kolchak, Feb. 24 1919

[6] GA RF. F. p-200. Op.1. D. 341. L. 31. Telegram of Ambassador to France V.A. Maklakova to the head of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs I.I. Sukinu for A.V. Kolchak, March 3, 1919

[7] Ibid.

[8] GA RF. F. p-200. Op.1. D. 341. L. 37. Telegram of the Head of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs I.I. Sukin to the Minister of Foreign Affairs Sazonov, March 10, 1919

[9] GA RF. F. p-200. Op.1. D. 341. L. 49. The Ambassador’s telegram to England V.D. Nabokov to the head of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs I.I. Sukin, March 11, 1919

[10] GA RF. F. p-200. Op.1. D. 341. L. 91−91ob. The telegram of the marine agent in Norway, Weimarn, to the Minister of the Navy, Rear Admiral M.I. Smirnov, May 16, 1919

[11] GA RF. F. p-200. Op.1. D. 341. L. 100–100ob. Telegram of Lieutenant-General E.K. Miller to the Chairman of the Council of Ministers P.V. Vologda, May 4, 1919

[12] GA RF. F. p-200. Op.1. D. 341. L. 51. Ambassador’s telegram to England V.D. Nabokov to the head of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs I.I. Sukin, March 11, 1919

[13] GA RF. F. p-200. Op.1. D. 341. L. 66. Telegram of the Minister of Foreign Affairs S.D. Sazonov A.V. Kolchak, March 17, 1919

[14] GA RF. F. p-200. Op.1. D. 341. L. 43. Telegram of the Ambassador to Sweden, Baer, ​​to the head of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, I.I. Sukin, March 11, 1919

[15] GA RF. F. p-200. Op.1. D. 341. L. 87. Telegram of the Minister of Foreign Affairs S.D. Sazonov, Head of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, I.I. Sukin, Apr. 27 1919

[16] GA RF. F. p-200. Op.1. D. 341. L. 101. Telegram of Ambassador to France V.A. Maklakov addressed to the Minister of Foreign Affairs S.D. Sazonov, May 4, 1919

[17] GA RF. F. p-200. Op.1. D. 341. L. 88−88ob. Telegram of the Minister of Foreign Affairs Sazonov, Head of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, I.I. Sukin, Apr 24 1919

[18] Hins GK Siberia, the Allies and Kolchak. M., 2008. P. 339; GA RF. F. r-193 (Vologodsky P.V.). Op.1. D. 9. Ll. 22-25. Declaration of the Russian Government A.V. Kolchak to the Allied Powers on June 3, 1919

[19] GA RF. F. p-200. Op.1. D. 336. L. 243. Telegram of the Minister of Foreign Affairs S.D. Sazonov, Head of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, I.I. Sukin, Apr 4 1919

[20] GA RF. F. p-200. Op.1. D. 341. L. 87. Telegram of the head of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs I.I. Sukin Ambassador to France V.A. Maklakov for S.D. Sazonov, May 7, 1919

[21] GA RF. F. p-200. Op.1. D. 341. L. 92. Telegram of Ambassador to France V.A. Maklakov to Minister of Foreign Affairs S.D. Sazonov, Apr 30 1919

[22] GA RF. F. p-200. Op. 1. D. 341. L. 98.

[23] GA RF. F. p-200. Op.1. D. 341. L. 113. Telegram of Ambassador to France V.A. Maklakov addressed to the Minister of Foreign Affairs, May 9, 1919

[24] GA RF. F. p-200. Op.1. D. 341. Ll. 117−120ob. Letter from Rear Admiral V.K. Pilkina to the Minister of the Sea, Rear Admiral M.I. Smirnov, May 1919

[25] GA RF. F. p-200. Op.1. D. 341. L. 103. Ambassador’s telegram to England V.D. Nabokov to the Minister of Foreign Affairs S.D. Sazonov, May 7, 1919

[26] GA RF. F. p-200. Op.1. D. 341. L. 109. The telegram of the Chargé d'affaires in the USA of Uget to the Minister of Foreign Affairs, SDD. Sazonov, May 8, 1919

[27] GA RF. F. p-200. Op.1. D. 341. L. 108−108ob. Telegram of the ambassador in England V.D. Nabokov Marine Minister, Rear Admiral MI Smirnov, May 8, 1919

[28] GA Russia. F. p-200. Op.1. D. 341. L. 111−111ob. Telegram of the ambassador in England V.D. Nabokov Marine Minister, Rear Admiral MI Smirnov, May 8, 1919

[29] GA RF. F. p-200. Op.1. D. 396. L. 58. Admiral A.V. telegram Kolchak Ambassador to Sweden K.N. Gulkevich for the General of Infantry N.N. Yudenich, May 26, 1919 (copy).

[30] GA RF. F. p-200. Op.1. D. 707. L. 1. Telegram of Admiral A.V. Kolchak to General G. Mannerheim, June 23, 1919 (copy).

[31] Ibid. L. 1−1ob. Telegram of General G. Mannerheim to Admiral A.V. Kolchak, July 10, 1919

[32] Diary V.N. Pepeliaeva // Kolchak Okrest: documents and materials / ed. A.V.Kwakin. M., 2007. P. 91. This fact is recognized by the Canadian historian N. Pereira (Pereira N. White Siberia: politics and society. M., 1996. P. 98).

[33] Diary V.N. Pepeliaeva // Okolost Kolchak. P. 92.

[34] Free edge (Irkutsk). 1919. June 26; Dumova N.G. The Cadet counterrevolution and its defeat (October 1917 - 1920). M., 1982. p. 255; Ioffe G. Z. Kolchakovskaya adventure and its collapse. M., 1983. p. 196−197.

[35] GA RF. F. p-200. Op.1. D. 404. L. 16−16ob. The draft agreement N.N. Yudenich with G. Mannerheim, b / d.

[36] Naumov V.P. Decree. cit. Pp. 95, 96.

[37] GA RF. F. p-200. Op.1. D. 713. L. 30. 30. Telegram of the General from Infantry N.N. Yudenich admiral A.V. Kolchaku, Oct. 27 1919


Link

Read more »